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“REVERSE STARKER” LIKE KIND EXCHANGES
— by Neil E. Harl*
The 1979 decision of Starker v. United States 1  revolutionized the world of like-kind
exchanges2 by allowing the replacement property to be acquired months or even years
after the disposition of the property disposed of in the exchange.3  While the Congress
later limited the Starker exchange approach by imposing limits on the identification of
the replacement property (on or before 45 days after the date of transfer of the property
given up in the exchange)4 and on the time within which the replacement property must
have been received (the earlier of 180 days after the date of transfer of the taxpayer’s
property or the due date, including extensions, of the transferor’s tax return for the tax
year in which the transfer occurred),5 neither the Congress nor the Internal Revenue
Service had officially addressed the possibility of a “reverse Sta ker” like-kind
exchange 6 until publication of Rev. Proc. 2000-377 in September of 2000.  So-called
reverse-Starker exchanges commonly involve acquiring the replacement property
before relinquishing the property to be disposed of in the exchange.
The reverse-Starker safe-harbor
In publishing Rev. Proc. 2000-37,8 the Internal Revenue Service has issued guidelines
for a “safe harbor” for reverse like-kind exchanges that involve “parking” the desired
replacement property with an accommodation party until such time as the taxpayer
arranges for the transfer of the relinquished property to the ultimate transferee in a
simultaneous or deferred exchange.9  Onc  such a transfer is arranged, the taxpayer
transfers the relinquished property to the accommodation party in exchange for the
replacement property and the accommodation party then transfers the relinquished
property to the ultimate transferee.10
The guidelines state that IRS will not challenge the transaction if the property is held
in a “qualified exchange accommodation arrangement” (QEAA).11  Property is
considered to be held in a QEAA if all of the following requirements are met—
• Qualified indicia of ownership of the property is held by a person (the “exchange
accommodation title holder or EAT) who is not the taxpayer or a disqualified person
and either the EAT is subject to income tax or if the EAT is a partnership or S
corporation for tax purposes, more than 90 percent of its interests or stock are owned by
partners or shareholders who are subject to income tax.
• At the time the qualified indicia of ownership of the property is transferred to the
EAT, it is the taxpayer’s bona fide intent that the property represent either replacement
property or relinquished property in an exchange that is intended to qualify for
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non-recognition treatment.
· No later than five business days after the transfer of
qualified indicia of ownership of the property to the EAT, the
taxpayer and the EAT enter into a QEAA providing that the
EAT is holding the property for the benefit of the taxpayer in
order to facilitate a like-kind exchange and the taxpayer and
the EAT agree to report the acquisition, holding and
disposition of the property as provided in Rev. Proc. 2000-
37.12
· No later than 45 days after the transfer, the relinquished
property is properly identified.
· No later than 180 days after the transfer, the property is
transferred to the taxpayer as replacement property13 or is
transferred to a person who is not the taxpayer or a
disqualified person as relinquished property.
· Finally, the combined time period that the relinquished and
replacement properties are held in QEAA does not exceed 180
days.14
The revenue procedure15 states that property will not fail to
be treated as held in a QEAA as a result of legal or contractual
arrangements enumerated in Rev. Proc. 2000-37.16 Also,
property will not fail to be treated as being held in a QEAA
merely because the accounting, regulatory or state, local or
foreign tax treatment of the arrangement between the taxpayer
and the EAT is different from the treatment in Rev. Proc.
2000-37, § 4.02(3).17
Effective date
The procedure is effective for QEAAs entered into on or
after September 15, 2000.  There is, however, no inference
intended for those entered into prior to that date.18
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ANIMALS
EQUINE IMMUNITY STATUTE. The plaintiff was injured
while riding on a practice sled pulled by two horses used in
pulling competitions. The plaintiff fell off the sled when the
horses suddenly started to move after the sled had been halted.
The plaintiff sued for negligence in the design and maintenance
of the sled. The defendant argued that the defendant was not
liable for the injury under the equine immunity statute, Wis. Stat.
§ 895.481 and the recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. §
895.52. Only the first statute was applied in this case. The
defendant argued that (1) the equine immunity statute applied
only to equine professionals and (2) that an exception applied
because the equipment was defective. The court held that the
statute did not limit its application to professionals. The court
also eld that the statute applied to the accident involved in this
cas  because there is an inherent risk that horses will move
suddenly and without warning. The court held that the claim of a
defect in the design and maintenance of the sled did not bar
